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This paper aims at explaining the dynamics of labor markets in Spain,
especially the high persistence of unemployment and the Beveridge curve.
We build a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium matching model, which
assumes failures in the matching between vacancies and unemployed. We
calibrate the model for the Spanish economy and simulate it considering
two sources of exogenous shocks: a technological one and a reallocation
one. The model is able to mimic the main stylized facts for the Spanish
labor market. Moreover, we show that reallocation shocks are the main
source that drive the labor market dynamics. We also analyze the dy-
namics of the Beveridge curve for Spain.
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11 Introduction
Although unemployment has been rising since the middle of the seventies in
European countries, Spanish unemployment has attracted a greater deal of at-
tention as it has been recognized to exhibit the largest rate. The Spanish labor
market has shown several features that are di¤erent to those observed in the
other countries, especially the persistence of high unemployment rates over the
last two decades. Extensive research that tries to shed some light on the per-
sistence of observed high unemployment rates exists1.
Among others, Blanchard and Diamond (1989), Pissarides (1990) or Langot
(1992), have shown that the Beveridge curve, the relationship between unem-
ployment and vacancies, is very promising in explaining the dynamics of the
labor market as well as the persistence of unemployment. The co–existence of
vacancies and unemployment re‡ects the existence of imperfections in the labor
market, such as coordination failures among economic agents. As Antolín (1994)
or Dolado and Gómez (1996) remark, the Spanish Beveridge curve is similar to
the ones of other European countries. However, that the outward shift of the
Beveridge curve that took place in Spain during the 80’s is characterized by a
greater magnitude compared to other European countries.
The goal of this paper is to analyze the labor market’s cyclical properties.
In the literature these cyclical properties have widely been explored. Kydland
and Prescott (1982) admit that more has to be done in the RBC literature in
order to explain the labor market’s stylized facts. Many extensions and varia-
tions have been tried, such as assuming indivisible labor (Hansen (1985)). In
our article, we deal with the matching framework de…ned in Pissarides (1990)
which proposes a model in which the allocation process in the labor market
is imperfect: due to costs and coordination failures, vacancies and unemploy-
ment co–exist; two main characteristics of the Spanish economy. The matching
model allows to di¤erentiate between technological shocks (movements along
the Beveridge curve) and reallocation shocks (shifts of the Beveridge curve it-
self). Following this motivation some empirical work has been applied to the
Spanish economy. Antolín (1994) analyzes unemployment in‡ows and out‡ows
and the causes behind the outward shift of the Beveridge curve. He concludes
that unemployment seems to be quite structural, and that changes in job search
intensity may explain the unemployment problem. Dolado and Gómez (1996)
study the dynamic behavior of the Beveridge curve at the aggregate level as
well as at the regional level. They conclude that technological shocks and real-
location shocks play a very important role in the outward shift of the Beveridge
curve. Sneessens, Fonseca and Maillard (1998) examine the outward shift of the
Beveridge curve in Spain through skill and regional mismatch, showing that the
structural component of unemployment is highly signi…cant.
1See, i.e., Bentolila and Blanchard (1990), Blanchard et al. (1995) and Dolado and Jimeno
(1997)
2In order to deepen the empirical discussion we develop a theoretical bench-
mark model for Spain. Following Langot (1992) and Mertz (1995), we build a
stochastic intertemporal general equilibrium model which generates persistent
unemployment. The wage setting is modelled as an individual Nash bargaining
process. We introduce two di¤erent types of shocks: technological and realloca-
tion ones. The former accounts for temporary changes in productivity, whereas
the latter accounts for changes in the hiring process. The assessment of our
model is done in terms of its ability to replicate main labor market moments as
well as to replicate the Beveridge curve for the Spanish economy.
The outline of the paper is as follows: in the next section we present the
model. In section 3 we describe the data and the calibration procedure. Section
4 presents the stylized facts and our quantitative results as well as the dynamics
of the model and its ability to replicate the Beveridge curve. Finally, section 5
concludes and presents some possible extensions.
2 The model
We …rst describe the matching model. Next, we present the maximization prob-
lem of the …rm and the households. Finally, we describe the labor contract.
2.1 Trade on the labor market
Following Pissarides (1990) we assume that trade in the labor market is an
uncoordinated and costly activity. At the beginning of the period the …rm
posts some vacancies, Vt; to …ll at a cost !: Nt is the number of workers at the
beginning of period t and Ut = 1¡Nt is the number of unemployed2. We assume
that only unemployed workers can apply to a posted vacancy. Coordination
failures imply that the match, Ht, is not perfect, but rather represented by the






where ° represents the elasticity of hirings with respect to vacancies, and Ho
is a scale factor. mt is a variable which measures the reallocation shock, the
e¢ciency of the matching function to create new hirings. This variable evolves
according to the following process:
logmt = ½m logmt¡1 +(1 ¡ ½m)log ¹ m + ²m;t
with the autocorrelation term j½mj < 1 and the standard error of the shock
distributed as ²m;t » N(0;¾m):
2As the number of households is normalized to one, the employment rate is denoted by Nt
and the unemployment rate by Ut. In order to keep the same notation, Vt is the vacancy rate.
3The probability of an unemployed …nding a job is given by pt =
Ht
Ut . The
probability of the …rm …lling a vacancy is qt = Ht
Vt . These two probabilities
are functions of the tightness on the labor market, measured as the ratio of
vacancies to unemployment, µt = Vt
Ut.
The law of motion of aggregate employment is given by:
Nt+1 = (1 ¡s)Nt + Ht
where s 2 (0;1) is the exogenous separation rate of employment — i.e. the
probability of a worker losing its job.
2.2 The …rm
We assume a continuum of …rms, denoted by j; with measure one. All …rms






where Kj;t denotes capital and At denotes the aggregate technological shock
which follows the stochastic process
logAt = ½A logAt¡1 + (1 ¡½A)logA+²A;t
with the autocorrelation term j½Aj < 1 and the standard error of the shock
distributed as ²A;t » N(0;¾A):





j;t ¡wtNj;t ¡ Ij;t ¡ !Vj;t
where ! summarizes the search and recruiting costs associated to post vacancies,
wt is the real wage and Ij;t denotes investment.
Each …rm j maximizes the expected discounted sum of its pro…t ‡ows over











j;t) is the value of a …rm subject to the law of accumulation of capital
and labor:
Kj;t+1 = Ij;t +(1 ¡±)Kj;t
Nj;t+1 = qtVj;t + (1 ¡s)Nj;t
4The possible state of nature is denoted by zt = (At;mt); which belongs
to set Z and SF
j;t = fKj;t;Nj;t;ztg is the set of each …rm’s state variables,
f½(z=zt)g1
t=0 is the pricing kernel and XK
j;t; XN
j;t are the multipliers associated
to the laws of accumulation of capital and labor, respectively3.
2.3 The households
We assume a continuum of households, denoted by i; with a measure of one. At
each time t they can, either be employed, with probability Nt, or be unemployed,
with probability Ut = 1¡Nt: Depending on the state, the instantaneous utility









i;t are the respective utility functions for employed and
unemployed households. Cn
i;t and Cu
i;t the respective household’s consumption
and ¡n and ¡u represent a cost, in terms of physical goods, associated to be
employed or unemployed, respectively. We assume that ¡n > ¡u and that both
costs are constant along the business cycle.
We de…ne the probability of …nding a job as the probability of being em-
ployed, Nt. The problem of the representative household i is to maximize the
expectation of the discounted sum of its instantaneous utility with respect to








i;t + (1 ¡Nt)Uu
i;t
ª
subject to the constraints:
NtCn
i;t +(1 ¡ Nt)Cu
i;t +
Z
½(z=zt)Bi;t+1(z)dz ￿ Ntwt + Bi;t
Nt+1 = (1 ¡ s)Nt + pt(1 ¡ Nt)
The right-hand-side of the …rst constraint expresses the revenues of the
households, who earn the wage when employed and receive Bi;t, the bonds they
accumulated in the previous period. The left-hand-side expresses the house-
holds’ expenditures, which consists of consumption and the amount of bonds to
hold for the next period. Implicit in this formulation is a perfect insurance sys-
tem that allows households to accumulate the same level of bonds whatever their
situation on the labor market is4. Finally, the second restriction summarizes
the evolution of aggregate employment.
3Appendix A shows the Euler conditions for the …rm’s problem.
4A more detailed description is shown in Appendix B.
52.4 Wage determination
We assume that each …rm and each employee bargain on the labor contract.
The solution criterion chosen is the Nash bargaining process as proposed by
Pissarides (1990). Whenever there is a match in the labor market, the employee
and the …rm …rst bargain over the wage, the …rm then demands labor in a
“right-to-manage” process.
Let 0 < » < 1 denote the household’s share of the total marginal value
of a new job, and hence its bargaining power. The Nash bargaining criterion


































where ¤i;t is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint of the
representative household, which corresponds to the marginal value of wealth.
wit+¡u¡¡n is the optimal choice of unemployment insurance. Symmetrically,






= (1 ¡ ®)
Yj;t
Nj;t






















j;t by their previous expressions. Assum-














¤i;t express the marginal value of a job match for the
household measured in units of goods. It implies that both the …rm’s and household’s marginal
values are expressed in the same units.
6The wage is determined by a rent sharing mechanism which depends on the
bargaining power of each agent. The …rm acquires the gain in labor productivity
plus the discounted marginal value of a new job times the probability pt of
…nding it. The share the employee gains is the di¤erence in terms of cost of
being employed compared to being unemployed.
It is also worth noting that wages and productivity follow close but di¤erent
processes, which is a novelty of the proposed models compare to the standard
business cycle model. This comes from the way wages are set, i.e. via the
bargaining process, which depends mainly on labor productivity but also on the
net value of a new hiring and di¤erences in consumption. We remark that wages
are highly procyclical since they are mainly based on productivity changes, while
the share the employee gains is constant over time6.
3 Data and Calibration
Assessing models consists in comparing their results with those of the actual
economy. The measures obtained from the actual data must be rearranged to
be consistent with our model. We describe …rst the data, then the calibration
of the model.
3.1 The data
All series are quarterly for the period 1977:1-1994:4. Puch and Licandro (1997)
elaborate on the National Accounts of the Spanish Economy (Contabilidad Na-
cional de España) to divide consumption into durable and non-durable con-
sumption. Following this de…nition we de…ne consumption as the sum of non-
durables plus government expenditures, investment as the sum of durables plus
original investment. Finally, we de…ne output as the sum of consumption and
investment.
Vacancy data are obtained from Antolín (1994) who corrects vacancy data
from the Employment National O¢ce (INEM) to take into account vacancies
which are privately advertised. Employment and unemployment data are ob-
tained from the Labor Force Survey (EPA).
3.2 Calibration
The Euler equations at the symmetric equilibrium as well as the equilibrium
conditions are log-linearized around the steady-state of the economy. The log-
linearized model is then solved following Farmer (1994).
Values must be assigned to the structural parameters in order to compute the
model’s equilibrium. Given information about aggregate variables and external
6The fact that this share is constant over time implies that the wage equation is independent
of the marginal utility of consumption. This comes from our speci…cation of the utility function
and full unemployment insurance.
7information, as well as the equations of the model in the steady state, we use
the restrictions imposed by the theory.
The separation rate, s; is kept constant and calibrated by referring to Antolín
(1997) who estimates this value for the Spanish economy with quarterly data
from the period 1977-1996. This separation rate is quite low as it remained at
very low levels until 1987.
The ratio of recruiting expenditures to output, !V
Y , is the ratio of hiring
costs to total output. It is assumed to be 1% in the steady state. wn=Y is
the share of labor in a competitive equilibrium model with a Cobb-Douglas
production function. We use the estimate of Puch and Licandro (1997) to
calibrate this ratio. The tightness in the labor market, µ; is the ratio of vacancies
to unemployment.
Table 1: Ratios and Probabilities






0.0203 0.01 0.83 0.17 0.0062 9.85 0.29 0.6529 0.0368
Castillo et al. (1998) estimate a Cobb-Douglas matching function with con-
stant returns to scale for the Spanish economy. From their estimations we take
the elasticity of hirings with respect to vacancies to be ° = 0:15: We assume
that the decentralized equilibrium is an optimum, thus » = 1 ¡ °: To simplify,
we assume that the cost of being unemployed, ¡u, is zero. The depreciation
rate of capital, ±; is found from the ratio i=k: The share of capital in the pro-
duction function, ®; the cost of working, ¡n; and the personal discount rate, ¯;
constitute a solution to the system of equations in the steady state.
Table 2: Parameters of the model
® ¯ ± ° » ¡n ¡u ½A ¾A ½m ¾m
0.3348 0.9952 0.0292 0.15 0.85 0.7073 0 0.9588 0.007 0.7 0.12
The parameters corresponding to the technological stochastic process are
estimated from the Solow residual
logAt = logYt ¡ ®logKt ¡ (1 ¡®)lognt;
which evolves as
logAt = ½AlogAt¡1 + (1 ¡ ½A)logA+ ²A;t:
From this AR(1) process we estimate the autocorrelation parameter, ½A; and the
standard deviation of the shock, ¾A: To complete the calibration we estimate
the parameters of the reallocation process, ½m and ¾m; such that the model
is able to reproduce the autocorrelation and the relative standard deviation of
employment in the data.
84 Can the model account for the Spanish labor
market?
This section is devoted to the analysis of the implications of our model economy
in terms of the Spanish business cycle on the labor market. Table 3 reports
some stylized facts for the Spanish economy as well as the same set of moments
computed using the models we investigate. Model I refers to the standard
matching model with a technological shock, model II refers to the previous
matching model with an additional reallocation shock.
Table 3: Second Order Moments and Correlations
Spanish Data Model I Model II
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
c 0.73 0.93 0.39 0.97 0.48 0.94
i 2.48 0.94 2.51 0.99 2.44 0.98
n 0.74 0.86 0.01 0.23 0.74 0.48
u 3.13 -0.73 0.07 -0.23 3.73 -0.48
v 10.37 -0.02 1.45 0.99 12.79 -0.04
prd 0.53 0.69 1.00 0.99 0.91 0.70
(1): relative standard deviation with respect to output
(2): present correlation with output
Model I fails to account for most of the relative standard deviations and also
fails in the contemporaneous correlation of vacancies with output, which is high
and positive in the model while the actual data displays no correlation. These
results are standard in similar models of matching, i.e. Langot (1992), due to
a transmission mechanism of the shock which is not su¢cient to replicate the
labor market. As usual in the literature, model II includes a reallocation shock,
mt; that improves the model’s ability to mimic the moments. The reallocation
shock implies a higher transitory productivity in hirings. Notice that in order to
calibrate the reallocation shock we have imposed that it has to reproduce both
the relative standard deviation and the autocorrelation of employment (0.74 and
0.91, respectively). The introduction of a new shock which directly a¤ects the
labor market allows us to reproduce the stylized facts of the Spanish economy
in a closer way. This especially improves the moments related to vacancies,
reproducing the correlation between output and vacancies.
We now investigate the ability of the model to account for the dynamics
of the Spanish labor market. Table 4 reports the correlations of vacancies and
unemployment at leads and lags.
Table 4: Corr(Vt;Ut+j)
Period t-4 t-3 t-2 t-1 t t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4
Data -.07 -.17 -.12 -.09 -.26 -.30 -.20 -.04 -.09
Model I -.73 -.73 -.65 -.48 -.19 .02 .19 .31 .38
Model II -.51 -.50 -.41 -.19 .23 .45 .53 .52 .47
9The data show that the Spanish economy displays a Beveridge curve. Unem-
ployment lags vacancies along the cycle — i.e. when the …rm …nds it pro…table
to create a job, it increases vacancies. Hence the number of hirings increases
some periods later, reducing unemployment. However, absolute values are not
too signi…cant and the maximum value is found at period t+1. The instan-
taneous correlation is negative, which implies an immediate adjustment to the
shock, yet correlations in t+1 and t+2 show that …rms recruit workers for two
more periods. This result is similar to that obtained with models in which the
production function has adjustment costs in labor and shows the lasting e¤ect
of a shock in the labor market.
The lag and lead correlations of vacancies and unemployment given by model
I are far form those obtained from actual data although are better than those
obtained from model II. Only model I is close to the actual instantaneous cor-
relation of vacancies and unemployment. In Figure 1 (see Appendix C), we
plot the correlations between vacancies and unemployment and observe that in
both models they have the same shape, both have negative correlations for leads
and positive ones for lags. However, model II always has a higher correlation
between vacancies and unemployment. These results imply that none of the
models are able to replicate the Beveridge curve for the Spanish economy as
the transmission mechanism is too dependent on the correlations between va-
cancies and unemployment for leads and lags. This result is a standard feature
shared by most of the existing matching models. Indeed, the reallocation shock
is introduced as a productivity shock in the matching function. In fact, we are
explaining the dynamics of the Beveridge curve around the steady state without
taking into account possible, and plausible, shifts of the Beveridge curve itself.
These shifts are explained in the Spanish literature as hysteresis (Dolado and
Gómez, 1996) or structural changes in the labor market (Sneessens, Fonseca and
Maillard, 1998). As a consequence, the model neglects part of the Beveridge
curve changes and only focuses on the short-term dynamics.
In order to provide the reader with a better understanding of the transmis-
sion mechanisms that underlie the models, we report in …gures 2 and 4 (see
Appendix C) the impulse response functions (IRF) of unemployment, vacan-
cies, wages and the tightness of the labor market, µ; to a technological and a
reallocation shock.
A technological shock implies an increase in the productivity. As the …rms
know that the shock will last for more periods, they increase their vacancies
in order to increase future employment. The labor adjustment is not contem-
poraneous as it takes at least one period to hire. This implies a reduction
in unemployment from the second period onwards. The e¤ects on vacancies
and unemployment induce a rise in the tightness of the labor market, µ; which
increases the probability of an unemployed …nding a job whilst reduces the prob-
ability of …rms to …ll a vacancy. Wages represent in this model the rent that
a new job creates. As the productivity of labor increases, so does the rent.
Thus wages deviate from the steady state for the contemporaneous period. It is
noteworthy that the technological shock is persistent and that the steady state
level of the variables is reached more than two hundred periods later. Figure
103 (see Appendix C) displays the dynamics around the Beveridge curve of the
model after a technological shock. After a technological shock …rms increase
the number of vacancies they post but unemployment does not fall as hirings
take time. In subsequent periods, …rms reduce the number of vacancies posted
and increase the hirings, which reduces unemployment. After some periods the
number of vacancies posted as well as the number of hirings keeps falling as the
shock implies less productivity and hiring is less pro…table. Finally, the dynamic
of the variables returns to the initial steady state level.
A reallocation shock implies the need for higher e¢ciency in order to …ll
a vacancy. Given the vacancies posted, …rms are able to hire more workers,
reducing unemployment. As the …rms know that the e¤ects of the shock will
last for some periods, they carry on posting vacancies. After around …fteen
periods the tightness of the labor market returns back to its steady state level.
This kind of shock does not a¤ect productivity, and hence wages, and has a
shorter e¤ect on the labor market variables than the technological shock. It
also implies a lower deviation of the variables from their steady state levels. We
also investigated the e¤ects of a permanent reallocation shock, but found that
it does not signi…cantly improve the results.
When both shocks are computed together, the impulse-response functions of
unemployment and vacancies for each shock go in opposite directions after sev-
eral periods. This reduces the correlation of vacancies with output and increases
its volatility. Given our calibration, the reallocation shock always dominates the
dynamics, in the short as well as in the long run. In fact, it accounts for more
than ninety per cent of the labor market variables after …ve hundred periods.
We have also tested di¤erent degrees of substitution for a matching function
exhibiting a constant elasticity of substitution7. Except for the required stan-
dard deviation of the shock of matching the results are not substantially altered.
On the one hand, for low degrees of substitution we need a lower standard devi-
ation of the matching shock, which implies complementarity between vacancies
and unemployment. On the contrary, for high degrees of substitution, the re-
quired standard deviation of the matching shock to replicate the persistence of
employment is unacceptably high.
Although the reallocation shock is able to improve upon some of the results of
the Beveridge curve, the calibration chosen implies that the standard deviation
of the reallocation shock is around seventeen times larger than the one of the
technological shock. This would imply that the main source of variability in
the Spanish labor market is changes in the e¢ciency of hirings. Changes in
sectors, skills or education could have motivated di¤erences in the matching
process. However, none of these models is able to reproduce the correlation
between vacancies and unemployment, the Beveridge curve, very well, especially
as structural or macroeconomic changes are not taken into account. Our results
7The use of a Cobb-Douglas matching function with constant returns to scale is still con-
troversial. Castillo et al. (1998) …nd constant returns to scale of the matching function for
Spain. On the contrary, Bell (1997) …nds increasing returns to scale for the matching technol-
ogy in the Spanish economy. Antolín (1994) concludes that he could not reject the hyphotesis
of increasing returns to scale in the ‡ows of vacancies and unemployment.
11are similar to previous models with matching functions and re‡ect the need of
additional improvements of the model to be able to fully explain the Beveridge
curve.
5 Conclusions
Our purpose in this paper is to build a stochastic intertemporal general equilib-
rium model of matching for the Spanish economy. The model is consistent with
the main features of the actual economy and reproduce the main stylized facts
of the labor market.
We …rst introduce a matching model with a technological shock and …nd that
it does not explain the main moments of the Spanish economy. Following the
related literature, we introduce an additional reallocation shock in the matching
function, and …nd a large improvement of the results.
Our main …nding is that the model with both kinds of shocks is able to repro-
duce the labor market moments, especially those related to vacancies. However,
it fails to account for the Beveridge curve, which could be due to the way the
reallocation shock is introduced or, more plausibly, by shifts of the Beveridge
curve caused by structural or macroeconomic changes in the labor market.
Our model does not fully explain the Spanish labor market as the matching
model only focusses on the vacancy-unemployment relationship without taking
structural features into account. However the main conclusion we obtain is that
the labor market seems essentially to be able to account for the business cycle
of the last 20 years in Spain.
In order to improve upon the previous results we have tested alternative
assumptions. We have introduced complementarity in the matching function
through a constant elasticity of substitution. Using di¤erent elasticities, we
have found that the results are not largely improved upon although the standard
deviation of the required matching shock is reduced. This could imply a type
of complementarity between both vacancies and unemployment in the matching
function. Testing the form of the matching function in Spain seems to be an
interesting extension in order to clarify all these aspects.
The model could also be extended to take ‡ows in and out of the labor
market into account. Firms should have to endogenize the departure rate in
order to obtain an optimal in‡ow and out‡ow from the labor market. This
could then be compared to actual data.
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147 Appendix
7.1 Appendix A: Decisions Rules of Firm j:
Each …rm j maximizes the expected discounted sum of its pro…t ‡ows over Ij;t










j;t) is the value of a …rm, subject to the law of accumulation of capital
and labor
XK
j;t : Kj;t+1 = Ij;t +(1 ¡ ±)Kj;t
XN
j;t : Nj;t+1 = qtVj;t +(1¡ s)Nj;t:
The …rst order conditions of the control variables are
=Ij;t : 1 = XK
j;t
=Vj;t : Xj;t =
!
qt
and the …rst order conditions of the state variables are
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j;N(t) = (1 ¡ ®)
Yj;t
Nj;t




½(z=zt)Vj;N(t + 1)dz = XN
j;t























157.2 Appendix B: The consumer problem with full-insurance








i;t ¡ ¡n) +(1 ¡ Nt)log(Cu
it ¡¡u)
ª
where Nt is the probability for an agent to work at time t; consumption when
the household is employed and unemployed is denoted by Cn
i;t and Cu
i;t respec-
tively. ¡u and ¡n are the cost in terms of physical goods of being unemployed
and employed respectively. We assume that ¡n > ¡u:
We maximize W(SN
i;t) subject to the constraints corresponding to each state
of the labor market (respectively employed and unemployed):
Cn











where ¿t is the price of the insurance contract, Ai;t is the insurance, which is
the same for both employed and unemployed households, and Bn
i;t (Bu
i;t) denotes
bonds accumulated when the household is employed (unemployed).












i;t ¡ ¡u)¡1 = ¤u
i;t
Ai;t : ¡Nt¿t¤n












i;t) is the Lagrangian multiplier associated to the budget constraint
when the household is employed (unemployed).
7.2.1 Insurance Company
The insurance company maximizes its pro…ts such that income is equal to costs:
¦ = ¿t Ai;t ¡ (1 ¡Nt)Ai;t = 0
The solution is ¿t = 1 ¡ Nt:








Moreover, if we suppose that the cost of being employed is greater than the
cost of being unemployed (¡n > ¡u), the consumption of employed households
is greater than consumption of unemployed ones(Cn
i;t > Cu





with full-insurance, Ai;t = wi;t + ¡u ¡¡n:
177.3 Appendix C: Figures





















































Fig 1. Beveridge Curve


























Fig 2. IRF to a Technological Shock







Fig 3. Dynamics of the Beveridge curve


























Fig 4. IRF to a Reallocation Shock
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